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A Perspective on
the Michigan Law of Damages
John W. Reed
Generally
To be most useful, this kind of introductory statement ought to
have two characteristics. First, it should summarize general (and often
familiar) principles. Second, it should take account of shifts and movements and trends, not only to make recent cases more understandable
but also to provide a basis for predictions. The truly professional
lawyer does not seek to know merely what the law is; rather, he studies
what the law has been, as well as what it is now, in order that his client
may not be surprised by what the law becomes in the near and middledistant future, the time when the decisions that will be made by his
client on his advice will be tested.
And so I shall first offer a brief survey of the familiar aspects of the
law of damages as it has been and as it is, and then move into the field
of informed speculation about probable imminent developments in the
law.
In undertaking to provide an overview of damages principles, I
labor under two handicaps. The first is personal. I am under the
disadvantage of having little prior knowledge about the field. You may
recall the old Danny Kaye movie in which Kaye, playing the part of an
Austrian symphony conductor, turned to the audience to introduce
the next piece on the program and said, in a heavy Viennese accent:
"The composer of this symphony labored under a great handicapThis chapter is a revision and extension of an article by Professor Reed,
Trends in the Law of Damages, which appeared in 3 Litigation 8 (Fall 1976).
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no talent." While I teach in the fields of evidence and civil procedure,
where one would expect attention to be paid to damages problems, in
fact the finer points of damages law are dealt with in such substantive
law courses as torts and contracts. I may be wrong, but I have the
impression that no major law school in the country today has a course
called "Damages." Certainly I never was enrolled in such a course,
nor have I ever taught one.
Accordingly, I had to do considerable general reading to gain some
idea of movement in the field. Although I characterize my lack of prior
knowledge as a handicap, it may have been a blessing in disguise,
because it enabled me to approach the subject in a journalistic fashion,
which probably is the best way to provide an overview.
The second handicap under which I labor appeared to me shortly
after I began to do my preparatory reading. I discovered that I had
been asked to deal with trends in a nonsubject. The subject of damages
involves translating harm into dollars, but it is not really a coherent
body of knowledge. It is a great exaggeration to refer to the "law of
damages,'' because it is simply an amalgam of many concepts and rules
having to do with fundamental policy questions about loss shifting,
about risk spreading and about allocation of functions between judge
and jury. Someone called damages "one of the minutiae making up the
law of remedies." Some years ago Maurice Merrill, a former colleague
of mine at the University of Oklahoma Law School, wrote a multivolume treatise on the law of notice, Merrill on Notice (1952). We can
agree that there are countless ways in which the giving and receiving
of notice arises, with rights and liabilities created and destroyed as a
consequence; and there are general principles that can be identified;
but it surely stretches our notions to think of notice as a major branch
of the law.
So also the subject of damages. There are some general principles,
but damages is not a coherent body of law. It is small wonder that
no one is writing books about it and that law schools do not provide
courses in it. The standard, most widely cited text is McCormick on
Damages, yet that book was published in 1935. There is no more
recent book of consequence bearing that title. Professor Dan Dobbs's
1973 volume entitled Remedies contains, as one part of the book, an
excellent analysis of recent damages developments; but McCormick
continues to be the benchmark.
As a scholar put it, the law of damages "plods its way, ignored by
academicians and 'accepted' by the courts .... The 'winds of change'
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sweeping over other areas of law rarely stir the law of damages. There
are a few ripples here and there, to be sure, but no one gets too
excited." Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury
Damages, 58 Ky LJ 36 (1969).
McCormick on Damages
Before we tum to particular areas, let us survey the general principles that appeared in Dean McCormick's useful book 40 years ago.
In 1935 as now, there was great heterogeneity of view. First, as
McCormick said, his book assembled these diverse views and simply
gave the reader the array of expedients that should be considered in
preparing and trying cases on the issue of amount. Second, he said that
anyone who ventures on the task of covering the law of damages in a
single brief volume must necessarily select for special emphasis certain
aspects of the subject to the neglect of others. However, he identified
four major problems dealt with by the law of damages.
First, what elements of the party's loss, injury or grievance will be
recognized as grounds of compensation? For example, in contract can
one recover for disappointment due to the failure of the bargain?
Second, what formula of measurement is to be used in fixing compensation for the elements of loss that are recognized? For example,
market value or value in use? Value at what time? In short, what
formula?
Third, what are the limits on the application of these formulas to
the recognized elements? Thus emerge doctrines of certainty, contemplation of the parties, foreseeability and the like.
Fourth, what procedural rules regulate the ways counsel can plead
and prove these things, and what procedural rules govern appellate
courts in dealing with these issues?
These four general questions continue to be the generic questions in
damages and, in one way or another, underlie all the concerns we shall
be considering.
McCormick dealt first with compensatory damages and the principal problems they present. Most important of these was the rule of
certainty, which he described as a standard requiring a reasonable
degree of persuasiveness in the proof of the fact and of the amount
of the damage. This rule, subject to a half dozen or more modifying
doctrines, was designed to enable the trial judge to insist that the jury
have factual data-something more than guesswork-to guide them in

1-4

INTRODUCTION

fixing the award. (Through all of damage law there is a concern about
guiding or limiting or supervising the jury in its evaluation of the money
it will take to make the plaintiff whole.) It was another way of saying
that damages could not be speculative or contingent. As of 1935 the
certainty standard was applied primarily to cases involving the loss of
commercial profits.
Other problems arising in the attempts to award compensatory
damages included such concerns as requiring the person harmed to
use reasonable means to avoid or minimize or mitigate his damage,
valuation problems (market value and the like), the concept of interest
as damages, and the American rules regarding counsel fees and other
expenses of litigation that could be assessed as costs.
The balance of the old McCormick book-and therefore much the
greater part of it-was divided according to substantive law areas. The
section on torts, as you might expect, dealt primarily with rules governing proximate cause (material that might as well have been in a torts
book), and it enunciated many particular rules like "the wrongdoer is
liable for the consequences of negligent and unskillful treatment by the
physician of the injured person, provided that he used reasonable care
to select a reputable physician." McCormick, Damages 270 (1935).
Other rules of that sort were included, all of them familiar to us now.
That subject matter (torts), of course, is not one of the concerns of this
volume. I mention it only by way of leading to the simple statement
that exemplary or punitive damages were discussed by McCormick
only in the torts section. (We shall see shortly that such damages are no
longer so limited.) In McCormick's almost quaint language, punitive
damages were said "to give outlet, in cases of outrageous conduct, to
the indignation of the jurors, and they are defended as furnishing a
needed deterrent to wrongdoing." McCormick, Damages 275 (1935).
The contracts section of McCormick began with a discussion of the
general standard of recoverable damages derived from our old friend
Hadley v Baxendale, 9 Exch 341 (1854), which laid down the familiar
rule that damages for breach of contract can be recovered for such
losses as were reasonably foreseeable by the party to be charged
when the contract was made. As of 1935, damages for breach of
contract could not include compensation for mental distress, however
foreseeable. There was, however, a crack in the door: mental distress
damages were allowed in some cases involving breach of promise to
marry, mistreatment of passengers by carriers and mistreatment of
guests by hotels.
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McCormick stated the familiar rule that liquidated damages constituting a good-faith estimate of the probable injury to be suffered are
enforceable, but that a stated amount fixed merely as a deterrent, to
prevent a breach, would not be enforced.
Even as McCormick provided separate chapters dealing with specific torts, he provided chapters dealing with particular kinds of contracts, such as employment contracts, construction agreements, sales
of property, and the like.
That, in a not very neat nutshell, is something of what the 1935
hornbook was all about. I trust that it triggers your recollection of some
of the main problems and that you get something of the flavor of the
then-familiar black letter statements of rules and exceptions and splits
of authority. There was not-I say this with all respect-very much
grappling with the economic and social values that, after all, underlie
and give rise to these rules. Awareness of those often competing values
is indispensable to the lawyer who seeks not merely to know yesterday's law and not merely to state today's law, but also to predict
tomorrow's law, thereby serving his client more effectively and more
responsibly. We must understand how these things fit, in the light of
tensions concerning loss-shifting and risk-spreading and judge-jury
allocation of functions.
Damages Since McCormick

What has happened since McCormick and 1935, and where are we
headed?

Certainty
First, let us address ourselves to the so-called certainty rule. The
rule for at least a century has been that a plaintiff is required to
establish the amount of his damage with reasonable certainty. Stated
conversely, a trier of fact may not speculate or conjecture, but must
have some factual basis for fixing damages. This probably has not
meant, and certainly does not now mean, that a plaintiff is without
relief if he can prove that he has substantial damages but simply cannot
establish the precise sums involved. Courts tend to say that mere
uncertainty as to the amount will not prevent recovery if the evidence
is of such certainty as the nature of the case permits. In short, the rule
is one of "reasonable certainty" rather than "certainty." We do not
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require proof with mathematical precision. As an English judge put it:
"As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on ... as is
reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of
the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon less
would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist upon more
would be the vainest pedantry." Ratcliffe v Evans, [1892] 2 QB 524,
532-33 (CA).
There is in the cases, however, a thread suggesting an irreducible
minimum below which one may not go. In a Tenth Circuit case,
plaintiff alleged that defendant had wasted gas on plaintiff's land by
allowing it to escape into the air. Plaintiff proved that some gas had
been allowed to escape but could not prove how much, except that
there was evidence of pressure from which a maximum could be
established. On this state of the record the court said there was no
basis on which a jury could make a rational estimate of the wastage,
and it affirmed the verdict for defendant. Shannon v Shaffer Oil &
Refining Co, 51 F2d 878 (lOth Cir 1931).
So, traditionally and now, generally and in Michigan, there is a
rule requiring some certainty-not absolute, but reasonable under the
circumstances-whatever certainty the case permits. What is sufficient
certainty obviously cannot be resolved by specific rules. There is little
doubt that a court judgment will vary not only between one time in
history and another, but also between one kind of claim and another.
Are we then left with no guide? Is there help in the more recent
cases? Perhaps there is. From those cases one gets the impression that
the more important it seems to vindicate a given claim, the more willing
a court may be to accept incomplete evidence on the damages issue.
Compare these two cases. The first is an antitrust case awarding lost
profits to a theater owner who was unable to get first-run pictures,
even though he could not show how much the profits would have been.
Bigelow v RKO Radio Pictures, Inc, 327 US 251 (1946). But in a
second case a federal district court denied loss of profits to a theater
owner when a film distributor breached his contract to supply first-run
rights to The Graduate, on the ground that the theater was new and had
no profit record. Eastern Federal Corp v Avco-Embassy Pictures, Inc,
326 F Supp 1280 (D Ga 1970); see generally Dobbs, Remedies § 3.3
(1973).
.
The difference between the two cases probably is not a difference
in the reasonable certainty of the profits. They were uncertain in both
instances. Rather, the difference seems to be one in policy of the
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substantive law: strong in the antitrust case but only moderate in the
contract breach case. Therefore, weak proof is enough in the antitrust
case and not enough in the contract case.
Neither is there a distinction between tort and contract, because
there are tort cases in which the court avoids a damage award, ostensibly on the ground that the damages were not proved with adequate
certainty, but in fact on the ground (if you read the case carefully) that
the court doubted that the substantive liability extended as far as the
plaintiff argued.
So I repeat, one concludes from the cases that if the court really
believes that a serious wrong has been done and that an important
policy of law should be vindicated, it will accept vaguer proof, or less
certain proof, of the quantum of damages than when there is no special
pressure on the court to vindicate the plaintiff's interests.
The certainty rule is most often applied to bar claims for loss of
profits. In the older cases it tended to be an almost flat bar: no lost
profits. It has even been applied in numerous instances when the proof
was strong and approached certainty. Why this hostility?
Perhaps the real explanation is that courts traditionally haye preferred to protect capital rather than income. We value property. Legal
protection of property goes back into the dim mists of English legal
history and beyond. A diminution in the value of property-a loss
of something known-can in one way or another be recompensed in
damages, but when we begin to talk about speculative profit, we find
the courts less interested. Whatever willingness there has been to allow
the recovery of lost profits has been most grudging. Any shift in this
direction has been limited largely to recovery of profits for injuries to
established businesses. There is a distinction in the cases between the
new business and the established business, with no damages available
for loss of profits for the business that has no earnings record.
Michigan, which has pioneered in a number of areas but has lagged
dismally in others, has recently jumped over the line here; there is
now strong authority for recovery of lost profits from injury to a new
business with no record of profits, in Fera v Village Plaza, Inc, 396
Mich 639; 242 NW2d 372 (1976).
Fera involved a failure of a shopping center landlord to make
available space that had been leased to the plaintiff, who intended to
open a "book and bottle" shop in the proposed shopping center-an
interesting combination. Apparently one reads more happily in such
a store. The shop had not yet opened, and therefore had no record of
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profits, when plaintiff sued on a claim for anticipated lost profits. Yet
the Michigan Supreme Court, with four justices joining in the majority
opinion, two abstaining and one dissenting on this issue, held that
the plaintiff could recover anticipated profits, and upheld a verdict of
$200,000 for the lost profits. The proof was as thorough as possible
under the circumstances. There were experts from the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, experts from the Cunningham Drug Store
chain who conducted similar businesses in the vicinity, and experts
who knew how· such stores operate in other locations. Between the
defendant's and the plaintiff's witnesses, the opinions about the lost
profits ranged from zero to $270,000. The jury brought in a verdict
of $200,000, on which the trial court entered judgment. The court of
appeals reversed, 52 Mich App 532; 218 NW2d 155 (1974), and the
supreme court reversed and reinstated the trial court judgment on the
verdict. The Michigan Supreme Court's great deference to what juries
do prompted the court to say: "While we might have found plaintiff's
proofs lacking had we been members of the jury, that is not the
standard of review we employ." 396 Mich at 648; 242 NW2d at 376.
TheFera case thus represents an unusual holding as compared with
holdings in other states; it allows speculative future profits as damages
for a business that never got started. A number of jurisdictions allow
damages for future profits for established businesses, but almost none
allow it for new businesses.
Foreseeability

In passing, I wish to mention one other general limitation on damages: foreseeability. I simply touch on it without discussing it at length,
for two reasons. First, it serves primarily as a limitation on damages
in negligence cases. It is not unknown in contract, but personal injury
cases are its prime focus. Second, the foreseeability limitation is subject to the same analysis and is undergoing the same trend we discussed in connection with the certainty rule. That is to say, if a
defendant's actions seem to violate a strong policy, the court will find
foreseeable certain consequences that it would find not foreseeable in a
case of less culpable or reprehensible activity. In some small part also,
foreseeability and certainty are two sides of the same coin, and as one
expands, so does the other. In law, if not in life, courts are requiring
defendants to be more foresighted. Finally, there is always no-fault,
which makes foresight irrelevant.
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The Collateral Source Rule

Any overview of the law of damages that purports to be concerned
with movement and trends in the field must take account of the collateral source rule. The collateral source rule has its primary application in the personal injury field. Nevertheless, knowledge of what
is happening to this aspect of the law of damages is helpful to an
understanding of what is happening generally as the courts continue
to adjust the allocation of losses and the shifting of risks between
litigants.
As you know, even though a plaintiff is compensated for his injuries
by some source independent of the tortfeasor-by insurance, for example-he is permitted to obtain full recovery from the tortfeasor
himself. It matters not that this may give the plaintiff a double recovery
or even a recovery for losses he never had at all. Illustrations are
donated medical services, wage continuation plans, social security,
workers compensation benefits and the like. Some courts do not apply
the collateral source rule across the board, denying it when the collateral payment is really a gift, but suggesting that if the plaintiff
himself paid for those benefits, as with an insurance policy, then the
defendant cannot have the benefit of them.
The reasons most often advanced to justify the collateral source
rule are three in number: (1) the plaintiff has in many instances paid
for these benefits; (2) the donor intended to benefit the plaintiff; and
(3) the wrongdoer should not get a windfall. The commentators nearly
all agree that these are stated reasons but not real reasons and that
the rule is retained for its value in financing personal injury litigation.
The padding of a tort award with collateral source rule damages helps
pay the contingent fee, just as pain and suffering damages do. The
collateral source rule probably will not be abolished until there are
new methods of financing litigation or until no-fault wipes out personal
injury litigation. Meanwhile, however, the rule appears to be decreasingly effective protection for plaintiffs, as defendants increasingly succeed in getting around it by adroitly suggesting other sources of succor.
In addition, there are now some statutes reducing plaintiff's recovery
by the amount of other benefits.
The collateral source rule was formulated in a time when such
sources were rare, when there was no health and accident insurance
or workers compensation. At that time also, conduct had to be quite
bad to be considered negligent. The tortfeasor usually was a rather
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bad person, or at the least, a very careless one. In modem tort law,
however, tortfeasors are by definition in the wrong, but are not always
morally bad. Now, jurors likely will infer the existence of a collateral
source-certainly will be receptive to the suggestion that it exists-and
likely will also think that if the defendant is not ~ morally bad person,
damages should be held down. As Harry Kalven wrote, "[The jury's]
plaintiff sympathy does not extend to compensating the plaintiff for a
loss which some other source has already made good." Kalven, The
Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio StU
158, 169 (1958). And the Seventh Circuit has said, "[T]he 'smell' of
insurance or workmen's compensation must be presumed to affect a
jury adversely to a plaintiff's cause." Mangan v Broderick & Bascom
Rope Co, 351 F2d 24 (7th Cir 1965).
Punitive Damages

Most of the general rules about damages-the certainty and foreseeability rules, limitations on damages for psychological harm, rules
concerning collateral sources, adjustments for inflation, interest and
taxes, and limitations on amount, such as statutory ceilings, judicial
control by means of additur and remittitur, and scheduling, as in
workers compensation-have to do with the law's attempt to provide
for damages that compensate the plaintiff, ·that make the plaintiff
whole, that place the plaintiff as nearly as possible in the position
he would have been in had the defendant's wrongful conduct not
occurred.
In fact, however, damages sometimes serve to do more than, or
something different from, restoring plaintiff to his condition before the
breach or injury or other harm occurred. An excellent illustration of
this different use of damages is in the field of punitive damages. No
portion of the law of damages is more in transition than that dealing
with punitive damages.
First, a brief word about the concept. As I noted, damages generally
are thought to be compensatory and are designed to put the plaintiff
in the status quo that obtained before the event occurred. We can do
that, sometimes, with respect to dollars. We typically can do that with
respect to certain kinds of property that can be repaired or replaced.
But we cannot do that with respect to emotional harms, pain and
mental suffering, and the like. In many instances it somehow seems
that mere compensation is not enough. So the law occasionally applies
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punitive damages not only to give vent, as McCormick said, to the
outrage of the jury, not only to provide something by way of an offset
to injury to so-called dignitary interests (as when someone spits in my
face), but also typically as a deterrent, along with the criminal law
sanctions, to keep people from doing that sort of thing again.
Thus, four purposes for punitive damages are advanced: (1) there
is a heavy element of deterrence; (2) there is some element of compensation, probably to pay attorney fees; (3) there is some element of
bounty, like the private attorney general doctrine, so that the possibility of punitive damages may encourage one to vindicate a right that he
might otherwise abandon because there would not be enough dollar
damages to make the action worthwhile; and (4) there is, some suggest,
a vengeful or vindictive aspect to punitive damages.
As for the amount of punitive damages, the theory has not changed
much. Most jurisdictions do not require a fixed ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. The emphasis is on hurting the defendant. McCormick spoke of exemplary damages as "smart money,"
designed to make the defendant hurt or smart. Obviously a thousand
dollars may make one person smart yet be nothing to another who is a
multimillionaire. So punitive damages have more to do with what it
takes to hurt the defendant and to deter him than with what it takes to
help the plaintiff.
Obviously, therefore, the defendant's financial situation is important. One reason for stating a claim for punitive damages, if there
is any ground for it whatever, is to aid in discovery. If you have a
claim for punitive damages, then in the pretrial discovery process you
have a tactical weapon, due to the leverage it permits, with respect
to discovery of defendant's financial position. Of course, punitive
damages must be legitimate, or at least arguably legitimate, in the
particular kind of case; but if plaintiff has any reason to state punitive
damages, allegation and claim of them will permit discovery of defendant's financial position.
In what kind of case are punitive damages legitimate? Traditionally,
punitive damages have been thought of as a tort remedy, there generally being no punitive damages in contract. The Michigan cases, few
in number, are in accord. Caradonna v Thorious, 17 Mich App 41; 169
NW2d 179 (1969); lsagholian v Carnegie Institute, 51 Mich App 220;
214 NW2d 864 (1974). But even by the time of McCormick it was well
settled that there were exceptions to the rule in contract. For example,
a breach of contract to marry involving seduction could carry punitive
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damages with it. A contract involving fraud could sometimes carry
punitive damages, but that result was not especially remarkable because of the similarity to the tort of fraud or deceit, for which punitive
damages were readily allowed. Finally, there were cases awarding
punitive damages for an oppressive breach by a public utility, the
idea being that the public utility had been given a favored position by
the public and therefore a breach of duty owed to the public merited
punishment. Thus, even 40 years ago there was a punitive damages
possibility in a limited group of contract cases.
More recently the courts have begun to give punitive damages
for oppressive breaches of insurance contracts. You know of the
multimillion-dollar recoveries in cases against insurance companies
held to have resisted payment to beneficiaries unreasonably. I suggest
that these cases, which seem so extreme, are not the end of the line.
The courts are getting around the conceptual problems in several
ways. In California, for example, the courts have been straightforward.
They have said, in effect, that oppressive breaches of contracts are
torts, and of course one can get punitive damages in torts. Other courts
have taken an indirect approach and have redefined some existing tort,
such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress, to make it apply
to the insurance case. A third-and, to me, preferable-way is simply
to declare that punitive damages are allowable for a sufficiently outrageous, unconscionable breach of contract. There are Florida and
Indiana cases, and perhaps an Ohio case, on that. See cases collected
in Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract
Actions, 8 Ind L Rev 668, 677 et seq (1975).
What is the thread in these cases? It is that in this age of consumerism, if an oppressive breach is committed by someone with superior
economic power (economic leverage), punitive damages may be assessed. It is the ''big guy-little guy'' disparity of power. It is the utility
cutting off services. It is the carrier breaching a contract for passage.
It is the employer deliberately firing the employee in violation of the
employment contract. It is the bank maliciously refusing to honor a
check. Most recently it is the insurance company seeking to force an
unfair settlement with a policyholder.
I see no reason to assume that the illustrations will stop there.
Indeed, there are two recent lndi~na cases suggesting that punitive
damages may be available against an automobile dealer unreasonably
refusing to honor a warranty in one case, Jerry Alderman Ford Sales,
Inc v Bailey, 291 NE2d 92 (lnd App 1972), and against a real estate
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developer who had sold houses around a golf course and then tried to
force the buyers of the houses to buy the golf course, Standard Land
Corp v Bogardus, 289 NE2d 803 (Ind App 1972) (reversing award of
damages because inadequate proof of fraud).
To repeat, when there is an oppressive breach of contract by a
person in a superior position, punitive damages are likely to be allowed; whether by defining the breach as a tort or simply by saying
that it is a special kind of contract. They will not be awarded, I think, in
contract cases where the parties are on reasonably equal footing. See
Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract
Actions, 8 Ind L Rev 668, 677-81 (1975); Galane, Proving Punitive
Damages in Business Tort Litigation, 2 Litigation 24 (Spring 1976).
Evidence in Damages Cases

Whatever the technical rules governing recoverable damages in
any kind of action, it is essential that counsel adequately communicate
to the trier of fact the dollar value of those elements. Even the most
liberal rule regarding certainty or foreseeability, or the like, means
little if counsel does not persuade the fact finder. In the personal injury
area, lawyers of great forensic talent have swayed juries with dramatic
appeals. In the more prosaic kinds of cases, there is less room for
poetry and emotion; but this does not mean that there is no need for
clear, imaginative communication of the elements of damage. Despite
all the criticisms of dramatists in the courtroom, the canons of ethics
do not impose on the trial lawyer a professional obligation to be dull.
It is not an overstatement to suggest that improvement in the quality
of communication with jurors has had as much effect on the size of
damages as have changes in the rules of substantive liability.
The new Federal Rules of Evidence and the new Michigan Rules
of Evidence make it easier for counsel on both sides to offer evidence
relating to damages issues.
For example, Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, dealing
with opinion testimony, relaxes and makes more informal the process
of expert opinion evidence of the kind used in theFera case. No longer
is it a valid objection that the expert opinion bears on the ultimate issue
in the case. The expert need not state the factual basis of his opinion
before giving it; and the opinion may be based on information not in
evidence-indeed, not even admissible-if that information is of a kind
ordinarily and reasonably relied on by experts in that field in forming
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opinions or inferences on the subject. Moreover, the expert is allowed
to testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise," if his specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact not only to determine a fact in
issue but even "to understand the evidence." In other words, he can
even be used as a "lecturer" to the jury (or court).
I take these various relaxations to indicate that it will now become
considerably easier to make use of the various specialists who have
helpful views about such damages issues as loss of profits, the effects
of inflation, actuarial calculations, market surveys, property appraisals, and the like. Any lawyer who tries damages issues is derelict
if he does not study Article VII and the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee Reports.
Another, much more particular, liberalization appears in Federal
Rule 803(18), making learned treatises admissible as substantive evidence. Although the authority of the treatise must be established, it
is relatively easy to employ as evidence, and trial counsel will find
economy in using the well-written text of the distant, expensive expert
on damage issues.
A third, still narrower provision of potential utility is Rule 803(6),
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. It provides that a
business record (with the usual elements of regularity and routine) may
be admitted not only to prove the traditional acts and events that are
recorded but also "opinions, or diagnoses" contained in those routine
records. Although the more obvious utility of that provision is in
connection with the records of physicians and hospitals-in short,
medical records-it may also be of use to counsel in some kinds of
business and contract cases in which the records contain regularly
entered opinions and conclusions as to causes and effects of various
kinds of transactions and activities.
The new Michigan Rules of Evidence are less liberal on these
various points than the Federal Rules; but even they are helpful to the
lawyer seeking more effective persuasion on the issue of damages.
The Future of the Law of Damages
It may be useful for me to conclude with some prophecies about
what lies ahead in the damages field.
First, I predict that the reasonable certainty rule will be relaxed, and
there will be more protection of profits on any reasonable calculation
or computation. Especially will this be true in cases of strong policy
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support for liability. In other words, mathematical doubts will be
resolved in favor of polcy concerns about conduct.
My second prediction, being obvious, requires little courage. The
courts will continue the centuries-old practice of fashioning remedies
for invasions of interests that come into being as society and technology devise new mechanisms for living. For example, the creation
of laws barring discrimination will be followed by judicial fashioning
of damages remedies for violations of those laws. The common law,
in other words, will continue to work.
The third prediction is that the collateral source limitation will lose
yet more of its vitality. Put another way, jurors increasingly will use
collateral sources as a basis for reducing damages or, even, deciding
not to award damages at all.
Fourth, I believe there will be more scheduling of damage amounts
as an element of the spreading concept of no-fault and as a restraint on
jury generosity.
Finally, I predict that in this age of consumerism there will be more
punitive damages where the powerful are found to have oppressed the
weak-where the big guy has oppressed the little guy.
Despite the general perception, supported by the lack of major
writing in the field, that the law of damages is relatively static, with
nothing much happening, there is indeed considerable ferment and
sense of change in the area. It is bound to make the trial lawyer
nervous. You may recall the old Chinese curse: ''May you live in
a time of transition." It may be a curse to live in a time of change;
but it is exciting, and movement of the law in this field will provide
challenges for you and opportunities for your clients. Put more directly, there will be more business for trial lawyers.

